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2. The science of man and the image of God
















what the next stage in the process would be. Thus, for example, the principle ex nihilo nihil fit （nothing comes 










3. Inductive inference （or causal reasoning）






































































ble way this could work: ‘If reason determin’d us, it wou’d proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which 
we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature 






































The justification vs. the genesis of belief
 The standard  interpretation of Hume’s discussion of causal  reasoning  is  that he really  is  raising  – and 
pronouncing  insoluble  – the Problem of Induction,  that  is,  the problem of  justifying our beliefs about the un-
observed. Hence his ‘solution’  is merely a ‘sceptical  solution’:  it  is not  supposed  to undermine  inductive 




































































the status of causal reasoning as a  legitimate  form of  inference. But  there  is an obvious  lacuna here: why  is 
there no need to meet the sceptic’s challenge? Why does the impossibility of providing a non-circular justifica-
tion of causal reasoning not impugn its legitimacy?












 This  line of thought,  I think, goes along with the thought that the sceptic’s very high standards  in her de-
mand for justification are simply inappropriate standards: we should not regard ourselves as serious cognitive 
































 The third and final element  in Hume’s response to scepticism connects with the  failure of  the Pyrrhonian 
recommendation to suspend belief. Suppose the sceptic accepts Hume’s point here, but tries to maintain that, 








 This,  I  think,  is  the  implicit remaining option  in Hume’s question to  the sceptic, when he asks, ‘What his 
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